We construct a dynamic model of a small open economy to analyze the eects of large energy subsidies. The model includes domestic energy production and consumption, trade in energy at world market prices, as well as private and public sector production. The model is calibrated to Egypt and used to study reforms such as reductions in energy subsidies with corresponding reductions in various tax instruments or increases in infrastructure investment. We calculate the new steady states, transition paths to the new steady state and the size of the associated welfare losses or gains. Our main results for a 15 percent cut in energy subsidies are: (i) Steady state GDP drops in most of our experiments as less energy is used in production. 
To understand the eects of subsidies and taxes on an energy sector and on consumption in a given country requires establishing a complete picture of the market in which it operates and of the various policies past and present that have applied to it. (IEA 2010c, page. 11) 1 Introduction A report by the International Energy Agency (IEA (2010a)) in 2010 identied 37 countries that together account for 95 percent of global subsidized fossil-fuel consumption and found that total fuel consumption subsidies were about $557 billion in 2008, a stark increase from $342 billion in 2007. Countries with the highest subsidies for energy turn out to be smaller, oil producing countries like Iran ($65 billion in subsidies in 2009, 20 percent of GDP), Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Egypt (IEA (2010b) ). The underpricing of energy can lead to excess consumption of energy that together with the need to nance these subsidies can have adverse economic eects, both intra-and intertemporally. Energy subsidies may therefore have large adverse eects on capital accumulation, economic growth, and hence welfare, especially for future generations. The IEA estimates that many countries forgo faster growth of up to 2.6 percent by subsidizing energy (IEA (2010c) ). Since 2008 many major oil subsidizing countries have started to bring their prices in line with world market prices, among them are China, Russia, India and Indonesia.
Many of the concerns about the ineciency of energy subsidies have focused on environmental aspects and green house gas (GHG) emissions in particular. The IEA (2010c) estimates that a world-wide reduction of fuel subsidies could decrease GHG emissions in the long run by around 10 percent. There are relatively few studies of the short-term and long-term macroeconomic eects of reductions in energy subsidies. These eects are complex and require an explicit dynamic modeling approach. There are many interrelated eects: (i) Phasing out energy subsidies alters the price of energy relative to other consumption goods and hence not only the quantity demanded for energy but also the demand for other goods.
(ii) The degree of complementarity/substitutability between these consumption goods together with the expectations of the time path for the phase out inuences savings behavior and thus capital accumulation of households. (iii) Changing energy subsidies inuences use of energy in production. Whether energy is a complement or a substitute to other factors of production inuences total output and marginal products of all factors of production. (iv) Changes in factor payments inuence household income and thus consumption and savings behavior. (v) Phasing out energy subsidies allows for other changes in the government budget such as changes in tax rates or other government expenditures, which in turn will inuence rm and household behavior. (vi) All of these eects are impacted by the degree of openness of the economy.
We use a dynamic model of a small open economy to sort out these eects and to analyze how cuts in energy subsidies to households and/or rms can aect a small open, energy exporting, economy. Our dynamic model incorporates overlapping generations of heterogeneous households, a public sector, and an energy sector. In addition, we distinguish between low and high income earners. In our model capital and energy are traded at given world market prices. Since we leave the world market prices for energy constant, our ndings are not directly comparable to estimates by the IEA (2010c) that try to factor in decreases in global cuts of energy subsidies. This paper argues that shifting public funds from energy subsidies to investment in infrastructure or alternatively using these funds to cut taxes on income or consumption can be welfare improving. The intuition is as follows. Cutting energy subsidies decreases household energy consumption as well as energy input in production, which in turn decreases output of nal goods and services. Both of these eects decrease welfare. However, decreasing subsidies relaxes the government budget constraint and allows cutting (distortionary) income or consumption taxes, or, alternatively, increasing public investment in infrastructure. These secondary eects tend to increase welfare. In the calibrated version of the model, the positive welfare eects tend to dominate the negative eects. This is especially true when the freed up revenue is used to increase funding in public infrastructure investment which is similar to the results in Berg et al. (2013) .
In order to obtain quantitative results the usual practice is to calibrate models to a particular economy. We calibrate the model to Egypt since fossil fuel consumption subsidies in Egypt are among the largest in the world. According to IEA (2010b) Egypt has the 6th highest subsidies out of 25 non-OECD countries with about $18 billion. As in many other middle eastern oil exporting countries the motivation for energy subsidies is to make fuel available to low income households at aordable prices (e.g., Castel (2012) and Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012) ). The energy sector accounts for about 20 percent of total GDP. Of course this number is subject to considerable uctuations given the observed large variation in world energy prices and the niteness of energy stocks underground. Associated with the energy sector is a large and important system of subsidies. These types of subsidies are not limited to the energy sector but extend also to food and other commodities. Total commodity subsidies account for close to 7 percent of GDP, with energy subsidies making up around 77 percent of all commodity subsidies, which is about 5.4 percent of GDP. Said and Leigh (2006) nd in a sample of poor countries that average explicit fuel subsidies amount to 2.4 percent of GDP. The large subsidies in Egypt thus merit scholarly attention. In addition, the size of the public sector in production in Egypt is large whether measured in terms of output, investment or employment relative to the respective total. Public sector employment is around 25 percent of total employment and public investment has in the past exceeded private investment. This large public involvement is especially pronounced in the petroleum sector where both the public investment and public employment shares have reached over 65 percent.
In the calibrated model we impose cuts to energy subsidies to households and rms and solve for the new, post-reform, steady state where the government can use the freed up funds to either lower taxes or boost infrastructure investments. We compare economic aggregates across the two steady states, we calculate the transitions to the new steady states and we conduct welfare analysis.
Our main quantitative results for a 15 percent cut in energy subsidies are: (i) Steady state GDP drops in most of our experiments as less energy is used in production. (ii) Steady state consumption rises in most of our experiments. (iii) Welfare can rise by as much as 0.6 percent in consumption equivalent terms. (iv) The largest gains in terms of output and of welfare can be obtained when savings from energy subsidy cuts are used to fund additional infrastructure investment. We also study cuts to energy subsidies for households only and for rms only. In these cases we obtain broadly similar results.
Literature. At least since the 1990s have formal dynamic general equilibrium models been used to study the inuence of scal policy on capital accumulation, economic growth, long run levels of income, and welfare. Examples of this literature include Barro (1990) , Saint-Paul (1992) , Ravikumar (1997), Turnovsky (2000) , Blankenau and Simpson (2004) and many others. Calibrated versions of these types of models have been used to asses the quantitative eects of particular scal policy reforms on economic growth. Most of these calibration exercises are done in the context of the US economy. These papers include Lucas (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and many others. In these models a typical result is that the eect of tax reform on growth can be very small as in Lucas (1990) , for example, while growth eects of changes in public expenditures on infrastructure and public education, to name just a few, can be larger. See for example Baier and Glomm (2001) .
There is now a small literature on the connection between energy consumption, pollution, energy prices and macroeconomic variables such as economic growth. Brock and Taylor (2010) , for example, combine technological progress in an environmental abatement technology with a standard version of the Solow growth model and are able to generate the environmental Kuznets curve as an equilibrium outcome. Smulders and Nooij (2003) study the connection between energy conservation policies and long-run economic growth. Moon and Sonn (1996) use a growth model to investigate the connection between energy expenditures and economic growth. Peretto (2009) shows that the connection between energy taxes and economic growth depends upon the precise interplay of the demand elasticities for energy and technological progress.
Similar to Peretto (2009) a part of the literature on the double dividend hypothesis of green taxes investigates the connection between energy taxes/subsidies and capital accumulation. Glomm, Kawaguchi and Sepulveda (2008) use a calibrated version of a growth model to study the complementary use of energy and physical capital in production to obtain predictions concerning energy taxes/subsidies and transitional economic growth.
The papers closest to the present one are Pereira and Pereira (2011a) and Pereira and Pereira (2011b) who study a growth model with an energy sector that is calibrated to data from Portugal to investigate the connection between energy prices and macroeconomic variables as well as Plante (2011) who studies the impact of energy subsidies in oil importing developing countries. One fundamental dierence between their papers and ours is that they study an oil importing economy while we focus on Egypt, which is a net exporter of oil. Other papers that have studied issues surrounding fuel subsidies are Coady and Newhouse (2006) , Baig and Ntamatungiro (2007) and Coady and Tyson (2010) . Del Granado and Gillingham (2010) study household expenditure patterns and focus on the distributional consequences of changes in fuel subsidies. The focus of our paper here is more dynamic with an emphasis on capital accumulation and growth.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. In section 3 we calibrate the model to Egypt and in section 4 we conduct policy experiments. Section 5 provides a discussion of the results and concludes. The appendix contains all tables and gures.
A separate technical appendix, available upon request from the authors, contains the details for all the model solutions and the welfare calculations.
The Model

Heterogeneity
There is a large number of individuals who live for J periods in an overlapping generations economy. The economy is open so that interest rates and the price of energy are exogenous.
We do not allow for labor migration. Each period accounts for 70 J years, with working life beginning at age 20 and life ending for sure at age 90. Workers are born with a xed innate ability that determines their income. In addition, workers can either work in the public sector or in the private sector. We denote the income type as variable income and the working sector as variable sector ∈ {P rivate, Government} . The agent is then characterized by age, income type, and working sector. We summarize this information in state vector θ = {income, sector} .
Here and in the rest of the paper the subscripts P and G denote private sector workers and public sector workers respectively. When we need to distinguish between the sectors we x the sector variable to one of the sectors and use the following state vector notation θ P = {income, sector = P rivate} and θ G = {income, sector = Government} .
Demographics
Agents have a random life time. At each age, agents face a mortality shock with a given survival probability π j . Population grows exogenously at net rate n. We assume stable demographic patterns so that, similar to Huggett (1996) , age j agents make up a constant fraction µ j,t of the entire population at any point in time t. Variable µ j (θ) denotes the mass of age j agents with characteristic θ. We normalize the population in each time period to one so that aggregate variables correspond to per capita values. It then has to hold that J j=1 θ µ j,t (θ) = 1. The relative size of each age cohort µ j,t = θ µ j,t (θ) is recursively dened as
Similarly, the cohort size of agents dying each period (conditional on survival up to the previous period) can be dened recursively as
In the following we will drop time subscript t when possible to not clutter the notation.
Human Capital
Agents are endowed with one unit of time each period and they provide (1 − l j ) units of time to the labor market with age dependent eciency e j (θ). Eective labor (or human capital) at each age is given by h j (θ) = (1 − l j ) e j (θ) . This varies over the life-cycle following the typical hump-shaped pattern.
Preferences and Technology
Within each period of their lives agents value a numeraire consumption good c, energy m C , and leisure l according to the period utility function
This function has the standard properties of monotonicity and quasi-concavity. Utility is discounted at the rate β.
Physical capital depreciates at rate δ each period and can be used in the production of the nal consumption good and the production of energy, so that
where K P is physical capital used in the production of nal consumption goods and services and K M is physical capital used in the production of energy.
Final consumption and services are produced from four inputs, a public good G, physical capital stock K P , eective labor (human capital) in the private sector H P , and energy M P according to the production function
This production function is homogeneous of degree one in K P , H P , and M P . The public good in the production function can be thought of as the stock of public infrastructure such as roads.
This public good is made available to all rms at a zero price. Specications of the technology similar to this one have been used by Barro (1990) , Turnovsky (1999) and others. Total factor productivity grows exogenously at rate g .
The intermediate good (energy) is produced using capital K M and human capital H M according to
Prots of energy production, if any, are redistributed to the government.
The government uses eective labor (human capital) of civil servants H G and public capital K G to produce infrastructure capital according to
This production function is characterized by the properties of monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity of degree one. This set-up allows us to not only study the costs of public sector compensation including pension benets but also the benets of public sector employment.
Public capital evolves according to
where we detrend capital with the exogenous population growth rate and the exogenous tech- At the beginning of their life, workers are selected into employment in either the public or private sector. We assume that for all cohorts in all time periods public sector wages exceed those in the private sector by factor ξ W > 1 in order to mimic the more generous public sector compensation scheme. Hence all workers prefer public sector jobs to jobs in the private sector.
We maintain the assumption that all workers of a given age and type are equally productive regardless of whether they work in the public or private sector. All workers will retire at age J 1 irrespective of the sector they are working in. We think of this as the standard retirement age, i.e., age 60.
Government Expenditures. The government nances investment in public capital
where ∆ G is the fraction of GDP allocated to public investments. 2 The remainder of government expenditure is government consumption C G . We let
Government consumption is assumed to be unproductive.
The government uses public capital and hires labor to produce public goods. The fraction of civil servants is xed exogenously at N G as a matter of government policy. The total wage bill of currently employed civil servants is
The wages of civil servants are set by the government using a markup ξ W > 1 over private sector wages so that w G = ξ W × w P . Private sector wages are determined by the market.
The government runs two separate pension programs, one for public sector workers and one for private sector workers. All workers of both sectors are required to participate in the pension program and consequently have to pay a social security tax τ P SS and τ G SS . When workers retire they stop paying labor taxes and social security taxes and are eligible to draw pension benets.
We summarize the payout formula to private sector retirees as
1 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to include investment ineciencies into the analysis.
2 GDP in the model is dened as the sum of private sector output Y and private consumption of energy pM MC .
and the payout formula to public sector retirees as
Note that the payout formula is a function of the workers average earnings, where Ψ P and Ψ G stands for the pension replacement rate in the private and public sector respectively.
In addition, the pension scheme for public sector workers diers from the scheme for private sector workers in contribution rates and benet payments. The total pension payouts for private sector retirees and for public sector retirees are given by P en P = total pensions private sector workers
and P en G = total pensions public sector workers
Government Income. The government collects labor income taxes from all workers in the private and public sector at the rates τ P L and τ G L as well as social security taxes τ P SS and τ G SS . Accidental bequests are taxed at τ Beq . The government also taxes consumption at rate τ C , fuel consumed by households at rate τ M c , and fuel used in rm production at rate τ M P . In addition, the government collects a tax on capital t K . The total tax revenue is given by T ax = labor and soc. sec. income tax from the private sector
+ labor and soc. sec. income tax from the public sector
wherep M is the world market price of fuel and q is the cost of capital. The government can borrow a fraction ∆ B,t of GDP each period t. These bonds are denoted B t+1 = ∆ B,t Y t , where ∆ B,t is set exogenously. Newly issued bonds have to be detrended with the exogenous technological growth rate g and the exogenous population growth rate n. 3 The government also collects all prots from the energy sector, EP rof it. The government budget constraint can be expressed as
2.6 Household Problem
In general, households in the private and the government sector have similar maximization problems. Households decide their consumption of nal goods and energy as well as leisure
as a function of their income type and their sector of employment as summarized in state vector θ. The household problem can be recursively formulated as
where j = {1, 2, ..., J} , w t = {w P or w G } is the individual wage rate which is sector specic, and T Beq are transfers of accidental bequests that are taxed at rate τ Beq . Notice that household assets are required to be non negative, i.e., households are not allowed to borrow.
Firm Problems
Capital and energy can be bought at world market at pricesq =q P =q M andp M respectively.
The nal goods producing rm solves the problem
Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2005) use a similar procedure.
given (w P ,q P ,p M , G) . The fuel producing rm solves the problem
Calibration
We dene equilibrium in Appendix A and solve the model for steady states using a numerical algorithm similar to Auerbach and Kotliko (1987) . This algorithm solves a complicated set of non-linear equations using an iterative technique commonly referred to as the Gauss-Seidl method. The algorithm starts with a guess of various endogenous variables and treats them as exogenous. Then, after solving all household and rm maximization problems and imposing the budget constraints and market clearing conditions, the algorithm solves for a new set of endogenous variables. If the new set of endogenous variables equals the original guesses, a solution to the system has been found and the algorithm stops. Otherwise, we take linear combinations of the guessed variables and the new solutions for the variables and start all over.
Once the algorithm converges to a steady state, we compare the model's outcome to moments in the data for Egypt. We use a similar algorithm to solve for transitions between two equilibrium allocations that result from changes in policy variables. We check for uniqueness of equilibrium by trying various starting points for the algorithm.
4
We rst calibrate a closed economy version to get prices for energy and capital. We then x these prices and adjust the total factor productivity of the energy sector to match energy export and capital import gures from Egypt in 2008. We present the parameter values that are used in the baseline model in Table 1 . Policy parameters are summarized in Table 2 and matched data moments are presented in Table 3 . We next describe briey how we calibrated the model.
Heterogeneity
We calibrate the OLG model with J = 14 periods to Egyptian data. Thus, each model period corresponds to 5 years. Agents become economically active at age 20 and die for sure at age 90. We dierentiate among two income types (rich and poor) and two sector types (private and public), which is summarized in state vector θ = {income = {low, high} , sector = {P rivate, Government}} .
4 There is no formal proof of uniqueness available for this type of Auerbach-Kotliko models (see Kotliko, Smetters and Walliser (2001) ). Laitner (1984) provides a proof of uniqueness for a linearized version of the original Auerbach-Kotliko model.
Our solution algorithm is locally stable. That is for changes in initial conditions (guesses of initial prices R and w) the algorithm converges to the same steady state. We have no proof of global convergence. It has been our experience that higher order dynamics in multi period OLG models with bonds can lead to multiple steady states. In such cases we were able to rule out Pareto inferior steady states (e.g. steady states that result in negative interest rates). Compare also Colucci (2003) who shows the existence of at least two steady states in a very simple multi period OLG model.
Demographics
We use population fractions by age group from the African Statistical Yearbook (2005) . The annual population growth rate was n = 1.8 percent in 2006 according to the United Nations World Population Prospects.
5 We then choose the survival probabilities so that the model matches the size of the dierent age groups.
Human Capital
Income proles are calculated using
We distinguish between low and high skilled workers, where we dene high skilled workers as workers with a post-secondary degree or a university degree. We pick the proles e j (θ) so that high skilled agents earn wage incomes that are twice as high as wage incomes of low skilled agents. The eciency prole exhibits the typical hump-shaped pattern over the life cycle.
According to Worldbank (2008) the skill decomposition in the public sector is 70 percent low skilled workers (i.e. highest degree is vocational high school) and 30 percent high skilled workers (i.e. post-secondary and university and above). The skill decomposition in Egypt overall is roughly 50 percent low skilled and 50 percent high skilled according to Worldbank (2009) . Given the size of the public sector, the private sector skill decomposition results in 43 percent low skilled and 57 percent high skilled workers.
In addition we assume that public sector workers are 20 percent less productive on average across both skill groups. However, the public sector income-age prole is higher reecting the more generous compensation (wages and pensions) in the public sector.
Preferences and Technology
Preferences are represented by the following utility function:
where c and l is consumption and leisure respectively and m C is energy consumed by the household, and 0 < γ < 1, σ > 0, 0 < Θ, < 1, and ρ > 0. The elasticity of substitution between consumption and energy is 1 1−ρ = 0.8 so that ρ = −0.25. Consumption and energy are therefore complements. The consumption preference parameter γ = 0.28 is chosen to get labor supply to be around 30 − 35 hours a week for agents in 5 Awad and Zohry (2005) nd that the population growth rate was about 1.9 percent for the earlier period from 1990 to 2005. their prime working age from 25 to 55. Both, the time preference parameter β = 1.022 and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ = 2.2 are chosen to match the capital output ratio.
6 Consequently, in our model the resulting capital output ratio is equal to 2.9.
Final Goods Production. The production function for the nal good is
where α i ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, ..., 4, α 2 + α 3 + α 4 = 1 and A 1 > 0. Total factor productivity A 1 is normalized to one. The exogenous technological rate of growth is 1 percent (Worldbank communication). The estimates for α 1 , the productivity parameter of the public good in the nal goods production function, for the U.S. cluster around 0 when panel data techniques are used (e.g. Hulten and Schwab (1991) and Holtz-Eakin (1994)) and they cluster around 0.2 when GMM is used to estimate Euler equations (e.g. Lynde and Richmond (1993) and Ai and Cassou (1995) ). Calderon and Serven (2003) estimate this parameter to be around 0.15 and 0.20. For a cross-section of low income countries Hulten (1996) obtains an estimate for α 1 of 0.10. We use α 1 = 0.09, which is a conservative estimate in order to not overstate our results.
The capital share of GDP is relatively high in Egypt so we chose α 2 = 0.52. Since this is a small open economy model where capital and energy can be traded at world market prices, the model also results in capital imports of 7.4 percent of GDP. Worldbank sources report estimates that range between 5.46 to 6.6 percent of GDP on average between 2005 to 2008. We set the capital depreciation rate to 10 percent per year. Parameter α 3 = 0.39 together with the preference parameter for leisure (1 − γ) determines average hours worked. We pick α 4, the share of energy in production to be equal 0.08. We chose this parameter to match the size of the energy sector in Egypt. The size of the energy production sector is jointly determined by parameters α 4 (domestic industry demand for energy), Θ (household demand for energy), and A 2 (energy supply) which we describe next.
Energy Production. The energy production function is
where A 2 > 0 and η 21, η 22, ∈ (0, 1) and η 21 +η 22 ≤ 1. If the production function exhibits constant returns to scale this will result in zero prots. If we have decreasing returns to scale, prots π M will be redistributed to the government. We chose η 21 = 0.66 and η 22 = 0.12 so that rms make a prot of 4.6 percent of GDP. According to the Worldbank prots from the energy sector are around 3 percent (Worldbank communication). In the model all prots from the energy sector are collected by the government. Total factor productivity A 2 is chosen to match the size of the energy sector and also the size of energy exports. In the model, energy exports amount to 5.4 percent of GDP compared to empirical estimates between 5.8 percent of GDP (Worldbank communication).
6 It is clear that in a dynamic model with partial price adjustments every parameter aects all equilibrium variables. Here we associate parameters with those equilibrium variables that they aect the most directly quantitatively.
Public Good Production. The production function for the public good is
where A 3 > 0 and η 3 ∈ (0, 1) . The fraction of civil servants contributing to the production of the public good is denoted ω h ∈ (0, 1). The remaining civil servants produce government consumption that is not explicitly modeled. Total factor productivity A 3 = 1.05 is chosen to match the size of the public goods sector. We have little information about the parameters of the production technology of the public good. We view the choice of η 3 = 0.6 and ω h = 0.4
as our benchmark and we perform sensitivity analysis on these parameters. We nd that our qualitative and quantitative results are relatively robust to changes in η 3 and ω h . Capital K G depreciates at 10 percent per year.
Estimates for developing economies, such as those by Pritchett (2000) and Hurlin and Aresto (2010) , locate the public investment eciency parameter e I G in expression (2) around 0.4 − 0.5. 7 We therefore set e I G = 0.5 for our benchmark calibration.
Labor Markets and Government
Labor Markets. In the model we assume that all agents retire at age 60, or J 1 = 8. The total number of periods in a life is J = 14 which corresponds to age 90. The government policy parameters are summarized in Table 2 .
Government Expenditures. Based on Worldbank (2009) public sector employment as fraction of total employment is approximately 25 percent. In addition, public sector workers earn on average up to 10 percent higher wages than private sector workers. Since this number is calculated factoring in income of informal sector workers, we pick a slightly more moderate markup factor of public wages of 5 percent so that ξ W = 1.05 to not overstate wages in the public sector.
According to Gupta et al. (2009) , 90 percent of the labor force is covered by the pension program. In order to not overstate the replacement rates in the private sector we decided to match the size of the pension programs (public and private) as percent of GDP as well as the government revenue from payroll taxes paying for pensions.
8 This allows us to not only match the size of pension programs but also their relative decit/surplus. In 2007 the pension system in Egypt ran a decit of 0.8 percent of GDP according to Gupta et al. (2009) , where the private sector pensions contributed a decit of 0.9 percent of GDP and public sector pension plans ran a surplus of roughly 0.1 percent of GDP. We therefore end up using replacement rates of Ψ P = 0.35 and Ψ P = 0.99 as well as payroll taxes of τ P SS = 2.8 percent and τ G SS = 16.6 percent. 9 7 Gupta et al. (2014) normalize and use the qualitative index of public investment management of Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) to come up with a quantitative measure of eciency.
8 Pension replacement rates in the public sector are 80 percent on average. Replacement rates in the private sector are higher. Estimates for replacement rates are as high as 150 percent of average lifetime salary (see Gupta et al. (2009) ). These high replacement rates in the private sector are the result of averaging. There are large groups of workers working in the private sector who have very low income and some of these workers are informal sector workers. However, we do not distinguish informal vs. formal sector workers in our model. The private sector replacement rates in our model are therefore much lower and chosen to match aggregate private sector pension payments.
9 The statutory contribution rates are between 21 − 24 percent for salaried employees and between 14 − 16 Government Income. In addition the government raises labor taxes, consumption taxes, taxes on bequests, and taxes on prots (in the model this is approximated using capital taxes 10 )
to nance public sector workers, government consumption, investments into public capital, and service of its debt. Capital taxes in Egypt are zero. However, tax revenues raised from corporate prots are three times the size of revenues raised from labor income taxes. If one excludes taxes collected from Suez Canal prots, the tax revenue raised on company prots is still twice the size of labor income tax revenue. In our model we use capital taxes as a proxy for taxes on prots and choose the capital tax rate so that revenue streams from taxes on prots are matched.
We set the tax rates so that revenue streams from the various taxes are matched to data from Worldbank (2009). We calibrate investments into a public capital that is needed to produce a public good (e.g. roads etc.) to be ∆ G = 2 percent of GDP in order to match the size of the public good production as a share of GDP (27 percent according to Worldbank (2009) . In our model the government share in production is 29.2 percent of GDP, 8.4 percent from public goods production (produced by a public capital and public sector workers) and 20.7 percent from energy production (produced by physical capital and human capital employed in the energy sector at competitive wages). Prots from the energy sector are redistributed to the government.
Policy Experiments and Results
In our experiment we decrease the energy price subsidy by 15 percent and let either consumption taxes (τ C ), labor taxes (τ L ), capital/prot taxes (τ K ) , or investments into the public capital (∆ G ) adjust to clear the government budget constraint in reaction to the simulated 15 percent change of the respective status quo variable. The policy changes are unanticipated by all agents and result in either decreases of τ C , τ L, and τ K or increases of infrastructure investments ∆ G .
Decrease in Energy Subsidies for Consumers and Producers
Energy is heavily subsidized in Egypt and the total energy subsidy amounts to roughly 5.29 percent of GDP. In this section we simulate a decrease in the subsidy rate by 15 percent. Steady percent for workers (Worldbank (2009)) . 10 Capital taxes in the model are raised on asset returns of households and not on capital stock in the production sector.
state results are presented in Table 4 . The rst column in Table 4 is the normalized benchmark regime before the policy change. We normalize all level variables to 100 to allow for simple comparisons between the pre-reform equilibrium and the new equilibrium after the reform has become fully eective.
Since energy subsidies decrease, the government can respond with either tax decreases or increases in infrastructure investments. See column two for post-reform steady state results with an adjustment of labor taxes τ L , column three for post-reform steady state results with an adjustment in consumption taxes τ C , column four for post-reform steady state results with an adjustment in the capital tax rate τ K , and column ve for post-reform steady state results when infrastructure investments ∆ G adjust to accommodate the drop in energy subsidies and balance the government budget.
Labor Tax Adjusts to Balance Government Budget. A decrease in the subsidy rate increases both, the price of energy used for the production of nal goods and services as well as the price of energy consumed by households. This cut does not have much of an eect on the domestic production of energy though, as energy can always be traded at xed world market prices, so that the value of domestic energy production p M M stays relatively stable. However, labor taxes can now adjust downwards from 5 to 2.9 percent to accommodate the decrease in energy subsidies. This generates an income eect that triggers various changes the households' consumption and savings portfolios.
First, we observe an increase in domestic capital accumulation K of 2.4 percent due to income eects (see second column in Table 4 ). This increase in domestic capital accumulation allows Egypt to decrease its imports of physical capital by almost 18 percent as now more domestically accumulated capital (via household savings) becomes available. The drop in the labor tax rate provides a direct source of extra income to working households so that they can increase their consumption level C by 1.2 percent.
Despite the lower tax rates, growth eects of output cannot be realized. The reason is that Egypt is a small open economy that has access to international capital markets. Since physical capital K P and energy M P are complements in the production function for the nal consumption good, cutting the energy subsidies causes a decrease in the return for physical capital, so that physical capital used in domestic production K P decreases by about 1.1 percent. This allows for a decrease of physical capital imports by 18 percent. All in all domestic output of nal goods and services drops by about 1.1 percent. Figure 1 depicts the transition paths for a select number of market aggregates. We see that after an initial jump, most variables converge to the new steady state in a smooth manner. The lower labor taxes directly generate additional income for working households which translates into higher consumption of the numeraire good C (panel 7, in Figure 1 ). Household energy consumption, on the other hand, drops immediately due to the cuts in subsidies (panel 8, in Figure 1 ). Whether this results in welfare gains or welfare losses depends on the relative importance of the nal consumption good C and household energy consumption of M c in the households' preferences but also on the extra income generated for each households. Since in this case labor taxes can be lowered after the government cuts its expenditures on subsidies, working households will gain directly from this reform. Retired households, on the other hand, will not be able to obtain any additional tax breaks.
We provide the following welfare measures over the transition path in Figure Comparing the welfare graphs in Figure 2 we immediately see that retired households will not gain from the reform, whereas working households are identied as winners from the reform.
Generation zero roughly gains 0.5 percent of consumption in each of its 14 life periods. In other words, if we took away half a percent of period consumption in each period from generation zero, then generation zero would be indierent (in terms of utility) between the pre-reform and post-reform steady states. We see that the retired generation does not gain at all, the working generation before the reform starts to have welfare gains up to 0.5 percent of consumption, whereas generations born about 15 periods after the reform can fully benet from the lower tax rate and realize gains of almost 1 percent of per period consumption. There is not any signicant dierence between the low and high income groups in terms of welfare gains. The second panel shows an almost identical situation for public sector workers. This makes sense as public sector workers are not treated any dierent by the reform.
Finally, we would like to measure welfare gains for each period after the reform, aggregated over all generations that are alive in said period. We express the aggregate compensating consumption units of all alive generations per period as a fraction of GDP in that period to give a better indication about the size of the overall welfare eect. We nd that the small welfare losses of the retired generations are more than compensated by welfare gains of the working generations, so that the reform creates an immediate aggregate welfare gain at the end of the period of its implementation. These welfare gains start growing to about 0.6 percent of GDP as the economy sets into the new equilibrium.
Consumption Tax Adjusts to Balance Government Budget. We next let consumption taxes adjust (decrease) to accommodate the drop in energy subsidies and nd that consumption taxes decrease from roughly 16.9 percent to 15.0 percent (column 3 in Table 4 ).
The rst dierence to the previous experiment is that now all generations can benet from lower taxes, not just the working generations. This has a direct impact on the welfare results, which we will discuss shortly.
The lower consumption tax triggers a strong substitution eect, so that households switch their consumption from energy p M M C to the nal consumption good C. We nd that aggregate consumption C increases by 0.6 percent. Similarly, we nd that household consumption of energy p M M C drops by almost 6 percent. Because domestic demand for energy decreases, more energy is now exported at the xed world market price. As energy use in domestic production M p decreases by over 7 percent (column three in Table 4) , energy exports increase by 21 percent to roughly 6.7 percent of GDP (up from 5.5).
Simultaneously, the domestic production sector of nal goods and services experiences a drop in output of over 1.3 percent of GDP as it now uses less energy. Negative income eects from decreases in output also aect the savings rate of the households, so that physical capital accumulation decreases and steady state capital K drops by more than 1 percent. The economy therefore increases its imports of physical capital by 1.5 percent.
The transition dynamics point to welfare increases that stem from increases in consumption C of the nal good (see Figure 3 for transition results of market aggregates and Figure 4 for welfare results). This extra consumption is made possible by cuts in the sales tax but also by increases in energy exports. It is apparent that these welfare gains are realized for both, working and retired generations, contrary to the earlier result derived from a labor tax adjustment. The compensating consumption that can be achieved in the long run is around 0.3 percent of per period consumption for private and public sector workers. The welfare gains, in terms of percent increases, are slightly larger for the high income group. Welfare gains expressed as fraction of GDP are around 0.2 percent and therefore much smaller than in the previous experiment.
In terms of implementability of these reforms, it will obviously be easier to nd a majority of voters for the second reform (using consumption taxes) as the intergenerational conict can be avoided.
Capital Tax Adjusts to Balance Government Budget. Capital taxes decrease from 15 percent to 5.6 percent as they accommodate the subsidy cuts. We observe the largest eect on capital accumulation in this case as the after tax return to capital is directly increased.
Steady state capital K increases by 14.6 percent (fourth column in Table 4 ). Egypt therefore decreases its current capital import almost completely. In addition, less energy is used in the production process due to the lack of the subsidies so that output drops signicantly. The additional capital that was accumulated by households is used to decrease the imports but does not increase the level of physical capital used in the domestic production process. This level, K P , actually drops slightly. Despite the drop in output Y, aggregate consumption C again increases.
Public Capital Investment Adjusts to Balance Government Budget. Lower energy subsidies leave funds for infrastructure investments, assuming that the government holds tax rates at their pre-reform levels. We assume that the additional resources can be reinvested at constant eciency levels e I G . According to our calculations infrastructure investments can increase from ∆ G = 2 to ∆ G = 2.7 percent of GDP (see column ve in Table 4 ). The extra infrastructure investments increase the production of the public good G by 22.6 percent. Since G enters the nal goods production function, the marginal return to physical capital K P increases, so that the domestically used level of physical capital increases by 2.8 percent. Returns to energy used in the production of the nal good would equally increase, however, the factor energy itself has now become more expensive, so that overall less energy is used in domestic production, i.e., p M M P decreases by almost 3.5 percent. All these eects combined will increase GDP by 2.5
percent. The additional income generated allows households to consume more nal consumption goods and services (C increases by 2.5 percent).
Decrease in Energy Subsidies for either Consumers or Producers
We next analyze the dierence in cutting the subsidy for consumers vs. producers. If we cut energy subsidies to households by 15 percent and leave the energy subsidies for rms in place, we nd that energy consumption of households p M M C decreases by over 4 percent whereas energy consumption of producers p M M P remains stable. Table 5 reports the results. The eects are typically smaller than in Table 4 where subsidies to both rms and households are cut simultaneously.
We next cut energy subsidies to rms by 15 percent and leave the energy subsidies for households in place. Table 6 reports the steady state results for this case. In this case we nd the opposite eect on the energy consumption patterns. Household consumption of energy p M M C remains relatively stable, since household subsidies remain in place, whereas energy usage by rms p M M P decreases by up to 9 percent.
In terms of output we immediately see that 15 percent cuts in energy subsidies to producers will decrease steady state output by up to 2.8 percent, whereas a similar cut of energy subsidies to households will barely decrease output. In addition, we nd that cuts to energy subsidies for producers allow for more drastic adjustments in the policy variables (i.e., taxes or infrastructure investments) which in turn will trigger larger substitution and income eects. The welfare eects are larger in the case of cuts to energy subsidies for producers, as in this case consumers are able to maintain their level of consumption of energy in addition to the increase of consumption levels of the nal good.
Decrease in Energy Subsidies of Various Sizes
We next implement cuts of energy subsidies of various sizes and let either labor taxes or infrastructure investments adjust to clear the government budget constraint. Table 7 reports the results of a decrease in the labor tax and Table 8 contains similar results of increases in infrastructure investments. The cuts in energy subsidies are again implemented for both, consumers and producers. The rst column in both tables shows again normalized, pre-reform steady state aggregates. Column 2 to 7 report steady state results for energy subsidy cuts of 25, 30, 60, and 90 percent.
Labor Tax Adjustments. In Table 7 we see that market aggregates are monotone when gradually cutting energy subsidies from 15 to 90 percent and letting labor taxes decrease to balance the government budget. The most severe cut of 90 percent decreases steady state output Y by over 6 percent, despite a 10 percent increase in domestic capital accumulation K (savings). Cutting subsidies to such a large extent allows Egypt to almost double its energy exports (92.3 percent increase). Aggregate consumption levels do rise by up to 4.9 percent. Infrastructure Investment Adjustments. Table 8 indicates that infrastructure investments can be increased from 2 to 5.8 percent. This increase is also responsible for a 7 percent increase in the domestic savings rate. Despite the fact that energy usage in the nal goods production decreases by almost 23 percent, the additional physical capital in production K P , as well as the additionally available public good (G almost doubles) will increase output by 7.6 percent. This is the largest output gain that we found in any of the experiments (see column 7 in Table 8 ). Finally, steady state consumption levels C increase by 6.8 percent.
Decrease in Energy Subsidies and Ineciencies in Public Capital Investments
In this section we explore the role eciency of public capital investment on growth eects.
When energy subsidies are cut, additional resources become available that can be re-invested into public capital. However, it is not clear whether these additional investments are used at the same eciency level as prior investments as argued in Berg et al. (2010) . In order to accommodate potential increases/decreases in public capital investment eciency we introduce a new law of motion for public capital
where e I G ,ss ∈ (0, 1] measures investment ineciencies of steady state investments into public capital and e I G ,t ∈ (0, 1] measures investment ineciencies of the newly available resources. In our experiments we rst decrease the eciency parameter of additional investments into public capital from the benchmark level of e I G ,t = 0.5 down to e I G ,t = 0.1 (column two in Table 9 ) and then increase it up to e I G ,t = 1.0 (column four in Table 9 ). 11
Increasing investments into public capital will increase the production of the public good G. If additional investments have low productivity G will only increase by 5.2 percent. With higher investment eciencies G will increase up to 38.9 percent. Since the public good enters the nal goods production, output will increase only if the additional input in the form of the public good can compensate for the drop in energy used in the domestic production of the nal good. This drop is triggered by the decrease in subsidies and the subsequent higher energy prices for producers. If the freed up funds from cutting the subsidies cannot produce enough infrastructure because of the low public investment eciency (the e I G ,t = 0.1 case) then output drops as the previous subsidies are wasted on inecient infrastructure production.
Decrease in World Market Prices Accompanied by Reductions in Energy Subsidies
A decrease in the world market price allows the government to reduce energy subsidies without raising the domestic price of energy.
12 In our next experiment we again model a 15 percent decrease in the world market price of energy paired with a decrease in energy subsidies that leaves the overall domestic price of energy unchanged so that old price in SS1
(
where ∆ sub is the percent reduction in energy subsidies and ∆p M is the percent reduction in world market pricep M . The adjustment in energy subsidies that leaves the eective price unchanged is therefore
11 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this experiment. 12 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this experiment.
At a benchmark energy subsidy rate of τ Mc = −30 percent, energy subsidies will have to decrease by 41.176 percent in order for energy prices to be unchanged after the world market price decreases by ∆p M = 15 percent. The additional resources that are now freed up are returned back to all surviving households in a lump-sum fashion to minimize distortions. We report the results of this experiment in Table 10 .
The decrease in world energy prices has a negative eect on energy production which drops by almost 50 percent and the economy switches from exporting to importing energy. 13 Since prots from the energy sector enter the government budget, the large drop in energy production create additional nancing needs for the government. On the other hand, energy subsidies decrease from 4.6 percent of GDP to 2.3 percent of GDP which frees up some resources for the government. Overall the drop in prots is larger than freed up resources from subsidies so that the government needs additional funds to balance the budget. We use the least distortionary instrument and simply charge all surviving household a lump-sum tax to balance the government budget which is about 0.3 percent of income. With the minimum tax distortion in place, the increase of cheap energy in overall production leads to growth eects that turn out to be welfare improving as both consumption of nal goods as well as energy consumption increase.
GDP increases in the long run by 2.4 percent which is mainly driven by the expansion of the consumption goods sector and the public sector. Figure 5 illustrates the welfare gains for all generations. Over time these welfare gains approach about 0.2 percent of consumption.
Conclusion
We have constructed a dynamic model of a small open economy, calibrated it to Egypt and used it to study the eects of a decrease of energy subsidies. The overall nding that emerge from this analysis is that a 15 percent reduction of energy subsidies to households and rms can either lead to decreases of GDP by over 3 percent or increases of GDP by a similar amount.
The expansionary or contractionary eect is mainly determined by the government policy that reacts to the subsidy cut and balances the government budget. If infrastructure investments are increased after the subsidy is cut, then growth eects can be realized. If subsidy cuts are handed back to households via lower taxes, no such growth eects will result as households simply consume the extra income and excess energy is exported at xed world market prices.
More severe cuts of energy subsidies amplify all eects monotonically.
Overall we nd that welfare gains for most generations along the transition path can be realized. Only in the case with lower labor taxes in reaction to the subsidy cuts do we observe welfare losses by generations that are already retired when the reform takes place. These cohorts are not able to benet from the lower taxes. We also nd that energy cuts to producers lead to more direct growth eects. In addition, positive welfare eects are also larger as consumers do not suer from higher (unsubsidized) energy prices and are therefore able to maintain their prior levels of energy consumption.
There are a few modeling choices we have made. First, we have not modeled explicitly the international trade side and the question of how these scal policy reforms would inuence the 13 In this experiment we assume that there are no labor or capital market rigidities so that capital and labor easily ows from the less lucrative energy sector into the other, now relatively more productive, sectors of the economy.
trade balance. Second, we maintain the assumption of price taking behavior throughout the analysis as since 2011 Egypt produced less than 8 percent of world-wide total primary energy.
Third, we have abstracted from explicitly modeling the formal and informal sector. These policy reforms undoubtedly would impact workers in the informal sector dierentially since they would be excluded from some forms of taxation. Finally, we have not accounted for a country risk premium that could be aected by changes in the debt to GDP ratios as suggested in empirical work such as Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) . We refer the interested reader to Glomm, Jung and Tran (2013) We model all markets as competitive so that all households and rms take all prices as given.
Given the government policy
and the exogenously given prices
a competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences of decisions of privately and publicly employed households {l j,t (θ) , c j,t (θ) , m c,j,t (θ) , a j+1,t+1 (θ)} ∞ t=0 , sequences of aggregate stocks of private physical capital and private human capital {K P,t , K M,t , H P,t , H M,t } ∞ t=0 , sequences of aggregate stocks of public physical capital and public human capital {K G,t , H G,t } ∞ t=0 , sequences of factor prices {w P,t , w M,t , w G,t } ∞ t=0
such that
solves the household maximization problem (6) ,
(ii) domestic capital demand, wages, domestic fuel prices, and the after tax interest rate are determined byq
(iii) aggregate variables are given by
(iv) commodity markets clear 14
(v) taxed accidental bequests are returned in lump sum transfers to surviving agents To match public sector size Capital share in production η 3 = 0.6
Sensitivity analysis
Public investment eciency
Pritchett (2000) and Hurlin and Aresto (2010) Productive civil servants
Sensitivity analysis Public capital depreciation
To match public sector size Human Capital:
Eciency prole
To match size of public good sector and hours worked Eciency prole low vs. high skilled 
To match debt level of 65% 
